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Abstract
Frictions, the Flow of Information, and the Distribution of Liquidity
by
Spencer A Montgomery, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2015
Major Professor: Dr. Tyler Brough
Department: Jon M. Huntsman School of Business
This paper examines the effects of short sale deregulation on market quality
by examining the implementation of regulation SHO, which removed the uptick
rule for a subset of pilot securities. This created an exogenous event, allowing a
direct examination of the effect of short sale constraints on the markets. This study
builds on Roll and Subrahmanyam (2010) in examining the skewness of bid-ask
spreads as they represent information asymmetry and market maker competition.
We find that the price tests conducted in regulation SHO evenly effected both pilot
and non-pilot securities, including a widening of bid-ask spreads and a decrease
in spread skewness. These findings suggest that short sellers are shifting from
liquidity demanders in the market to liquidity providers in the markets. This
change is associated with positive effects in the price discovery process and overall
market quality.
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Public Abstract
Frictions, the Flow of Information, and the Distribution of Liquidity
by
Spencer A Montgomery, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2015
Major Professor: Dr. Tyler Brough
Department: Jon M. Huntsman School of Business
The paper examines how financial regulations effect market quality by exam-
ining the roles of short sellers in the market. Past research has demonstrated that
short sellers can be generally broken into two categories; liquidity demanders, who
generally act on short term price fluctuations in the market and are known as mo-
mentum traders, and liquidity suppliers, who are generally contrarian traders, and
research has shown improve market quality and aid in the process of information
being incorporated into prices. The implementation of regulation SHO temporar-
ily suspended the uptick rule, a regulation which prohibited short sellers from
executing trades until the stock price has gone up, for a set of randomly selected
securities. We find that short sellers increasingly become liquidity providers, a
change which is associated with increases in market efficiency and aiding in price
discovery.
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10.1 Introduction
Few topics in financial markets are more evocative and fiercely debated by
regulators, politicians, academics, and the media than short selling. On one hand
a majority of academic research has found that short selling can play a positive
role in the markets; correcting short term price deviations away from fundamental
value, provide liquidity, and aid in the price discovery process. Media outlets have
stated on the other hand that “Wall Streets short sellers are worse than ambulance-
chasing lawyers. Not only do they seek profit from others misfortunes, butspecial-
ize in sinking vulnerable stocks with barrages of bad-mouthing.“ 1 Additionally
politicians, such as Barney Frank ( former Congressman from Massachusetts) have
pushed for increased short sale regulation to avoid market manipulation through
short selling.2In response, regulators have been quick to employ rules and regu-
lations to discourage and/or limit short selling in markets. This paper examines
the effects of a temporary relaxation of short sale constraints and the subsequent
effects on the markets.
During the height of the great depression in the summer of 1934 the Securities
Exchange Act was passed, establishing the regulation of secondary markets and the
creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). An investigation into
the market break of 1937 prompted the SEC to implement rule 10a-1 (the uptick
rule) in 1938 which provisioned that a listed security may be sold short: (i) at a
price above the price at which the immediately preceding sale was effected (plus
tick), or (ii) at the last sale price if it is higher than the last different price (zero-plus
tick). Conversely, short sales are not permitted on minus ticks or zero-minus ticks,
subject to narrow exceptions.3 This rule was established with the aim of preventing
short sellers from pouncing on securities in sharp declines, further adding to the
downward momentum and destabilizing the markets. Though financial markets
would undergo dramatic technological evolutions, tick size changes, and market
changes over the following 69 years, the uptick rule remained unchanged.
1https://ii-uploads.s3.amazonaws.com/shareadvisor/splreports/IISRJ imChanosMasterclassDec14.pdf
2https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/lglosten/papers/Fox%20et%20al%2054.3.pdf
3https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/34-42037.htm
2On January 3rd 2005, the SEC implemented a new regulation regarding short
selling, Regulation SHO (Reg SHO). This regulation established a short selling
circuit breaker which halted trading after dramatic declines in security prices, and
location and close out requirements aimed at preventing naked short selling. Along
with these new rules, Reg SHO also created Rule 202T, a Pilot program with the
goal of evaluating the overall effectiveness of price test restrictions on short sales.
The Pilot will allow the Commission to obtain data on the impact of short selling
in the absence of a price test.4 This meant the SEC would, for certain securities,
suspend the uptick rule in order to study the effects the absence of this price test
regulation would have on the market. This program was originally intended to be
in place for one year, beginning on May 2nd 2005 and ending on April 28th 2006.
The program however was extended through August 6th 2007. 5
In order to create a sample of securities which would have the uptick rule
suspended, the SEC selected roughly 1,000 stocks, comprising every third security
of the Russell 3000 index, which comprises the largest 3,000 U.S. companies, when
sorted by volume. The non-pilot, or control stocks, comprised the remainder of
the Russell 3000 index, as well as the rest of the universe of stocks. The random
selection of the pilot stocks created an exogenous event which allowed the direct
comparison of stocks pre and post SHO implementation. This removal of the short
sale restrictions enables the examination of the effects short sale regulations on
price efficiency, the price discovery process, market volatility and market liquidity.
Evaluating the past literature of the effects on short selling and market effi-
ciency reveals a wealth of information. Diether, Lee and Werner (2008) find short
sellers compose a significant segment of share volume on both the Nasdaq and
NYSE at 31% and 24% respectively. These findings also indicate that short sell-
ing strategies, such as short selling during periods of high asymmetric information,
after periods of high positive returns, and days with significant buying pressure,
generate positive abnormal returns of 1.39% per month. Boehmer, Jones, and
Zhang (2008) examine the ban or short sales for nearly 1000 financial stocks in
4https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/shopilot.htm
53. Securities and Exchange Act Release No. 53684 (April 20, 2006).
3September of 2008. They find that shorting activity drops by an average of 77%
for large cap stocks. They further find that market quality was worsened due to
high frequency traders inability to act as market makers during the ban.
Boehmer and Wu (2010) examine the role of short selling in the price discov-
ery process, which is how information is incorporated into security prices. Their
findings suggest that short selling increases market efficiency and keep prices more
in line with fundamentals. Blau and Brough (2011) examine bear raids, or pe-
riods of consecutive abnormal short selling, a concern which originally prompted
the implementation of the uptick rule. They find that these bear raids occur after
periods of steep positive returns, rather than negative. This implies that short
sellers are acting as contrarian traders knocking prices back down to fundamental
levels, rather than ambushing companies under steep price duress.
Diether, Lee and Werner (2009b) examined the effects of Reg SHO and found
increases in short selling activity for securities listed under both the NYSE and
NASDAQ, but measures of market quality such as returns and daily volatility were
not affected by the increase in short sales. Roll and Subrahmanyam (2010) find
that Bid-ask spreads become increasingly right skewed according due to competi-
tion between market makers, inhibiting the ability of market makers to cross sub-
sidize during periods of high and low asymmetric information. Finally, Comerton-
Forde, Jones, and Putni (2011) find that short sellers fall into two distinct groups,
liquidity demanders, and liquidity providers. Liquidity demanders are generally
momentum traders, whereas liquidity providers are contrarian traders, who often
step in when spreads for a security are abnormally wide. Building on this research,
this paper aims to examine the effects that the relaxation of short sale constraints,
by removing the uptick rule, have on market quality.
0.2 Data Description
The data in this analysis was obtained from the Center for Research on Se-
curity Prices (CRSP). This data contained information on the universe of stocks
from February 2nd 2005 to July 26th 2005, or 60 trading days prior to and post
price test implementation of May 2nd 2005. This 60 day sample size was chosen
4to focus on the immediate effects of Reg SHO, while still providing an adequately
large sample size. Along with the information provided by CRSP, the following
variables were calculated:
Closing Spreads: The calculation of closing spreads was conducted by differenc-
ing the ask and bid prices, scaled by the midpoint as such: AskPrice−BidPrice
(AskPrice+BidPrice)/2
Market Capitalization: Market Cap was obtained by multiplying the security
price by the shares outstanding. This result was then scaled by the natural
log to obtain the lognormal daily market capitalization of each security.
Turnover: Share turnover was calculated by taking the quotient of daily volume
and shares outstanding.
High Price: The high priced was calculated as the absolute value of the highest
daily trading price.
Low Price: The low price was calculated as the absolute value of the lowest daily
trading price.
Price Volatility: Price volatility was calculated following the research of Diether,
Lee, and Werner (2009) by taking the difference between the daily high and
low prices and dividing by the high price as such:
highprice−lowprice
highprice
Illiquidity: The illiquidity estimate was calculated as proposed by Amihud (2002)
as a proxy for illiquidity. This is calculated by using the realized scaled
volatility as:
|DailyReturn|
DailyV olume * 100,000
Beta: CAPM betas(β) were estimated in the pre/post SHO time periods.
In total, 742,602 observations across 43 variables were analyzed with 112,013 ob-
servations of pilot securities and 630,589 observations of control securities. The
variation in the size between the pilot and non-pilot securities arises from the fact
that pilot securities were drawn strictly from the Russell 3000 index, whereas the
5non-pilot control securities comprise the entire universe of stocks. To reduce the
likelihood of results being influenced and biased by outlying securities, stocks be-
low $2.00 were removed from the sample. A list of securities which were chosen to
be in the pilot program was obtained online from the SEC.
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the pre/post SHO time period for
all stocks, both pilot and non-pilot. This allows an examination of the market
as a whole before isolating for pilot and control securities. Summary statistics
were calculated for variables of interest including: price volatility, share turnover,
illiquidity (as measured by Amihuds illiquidity measure), dollar spreads, and the
moments of the spread distribution as spread mean, standard deviation, skewness
and kurtosis.
Panel A. of Table 1 reports securities in the pre SHO time period. In this
period the average market cap of companies was $2.74 billion with a median value
of $356 million. The daily price volatility was 2.87%, with an illiquidity measure
of 0.25 and share turnover of 8.3235. The moments of spread include an average
spread of 0.0056, spread standard deviation (or spread volatility) of 0.0043, spread
skewness of 1.48, and spread kurtosis of 7.05. The post SHO time period is reported
in Panel B. The average market cap during this time period decreased to $2.71
billion with a median value of $356 million. Price volatility is 2.7%, illiquidity of
0.29, and share turnover of 7.95. The spread moments included an average spread
of 0.0062, spread volatility of 0.0044, skewness of 1.39 and kurtosis of 6.65.
0.3 Empirical Results
In Table 2 the data was broken down to analyze market wide changes before
taking into consideration the individual changes by pilot/control securities. The
mean for each variable was calculated for both the pre and post SHO time periods,
which make up columns 1 and 2 respectively. Column 3 represents the difference
between the two time periods, as calculated by differencing the post and pre val-
ues. Column 4 represents the same change calculated in column 3, expressed as
a percentage change. The significance in each change was then measured by per-
forming a T-test assuming equal variances. The statistical significance is then
6reported, as well as the corresponding P-value in parenthesis. This showed that
the spread for all securities increased by over 10%, illiquidity increased by over
14%, share turnover decreased by 4.51%, spread skewness decreased by 6.42% and
spread volatility increased by 2.77%. All of these changes are statistically signifi-
cant with P-values (¡.0001). These results demonstrate that significant differences
existed between the pre and post SHO implementation periods.
To examine how the pilot and control securities changed with the implemen-
tation of Reg SHO, the data was broken into sub-datasets for pilot and control
stocks. The pilot stock dataset included 55,870 observations pre SHO, and 56,143
post SHO. The control stock dataset contained 311,883 observations pre SHO,
and 318,756 post SHO. The variables analyzed include: spread, dollar spread,
price volatility, illiquidity, spread skewness, spread kurtosis, and spread standard
deviation.
Pilot securities registered an increase in average spreads by 8.25%, dollar
spread increases of 5.73%, and price volatility decreases of 6.13%, all of which
are significant at the 1% level. The moments of the bid-ask spread distribution
also underwent statistically significant changes, with spread skewness decreasing
by 7.58%, spread kurtosis decreasing by 5.38% and spread standard deviation
decreasing by 4.99%. These changes line up with prior research into the effects of
Reg SHO 6 which showed a small, but statistically significant increase in spreads for
both pilot and control securities. Illiquidity increased by 19.15%, though at a less
significant level (P-value of 0.0513) for pilot securities. The non-pilot control
securities registered an increase in spreads by 10.71%, dollar spreads increased
by 3.58%, however this increase was not statistically significant, price volatility
decreased by 5.45% and illiquidity increased by 14.36%. Spread skewness decreased
by 6.20%, kurtosis decreased by 5.52% and spread volatility increased by 3.18%
These numbers follow the same direction of movements as the pilot securities, with
the exception of spread volatility, indicating that Reg SHO does have a statistically
significant effect on the variables of interest, in most cases the changes for both
pilot and control securities experience changes in the same direction.
6Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009)
7Table 4 examines how the changes in the pre and post SHO time periods
for both pilot and control securities compare. This is accomplished by taking the
change undergone in the pilot securities, the change undergone in the control secu-
rities, and differencing these two values, creating a difference in differences value.
Column 1 represents the difference between the pre and post SHO implementation
for spread, dollar spread, price volatility, illiquidity, spread skewness, kurtosis and
volatility for pilot securities. Similarly column 2 represents these same differences
undergone by the control securities. Column 3 represents a new value, a differ-
ence in differences, which takes the difference between the control securities and
the pilot securities. This value can then be tested to see if the changes under-
gone by pilot and control securities are statistically different from each other. For
all variables, with the exception of price volatility, the pilot and control variables
underwent statistically different changes, or levels of change under SHO implemen-
tation. This allows us to conclude that even if the direction of movements were
the same for pilot and control securities, the level of the movements was different
enough to be statistically significant. This could be potentially explained by the
sample differences between the pilot and control securities, however the results are
still significant in examining the changes in pilot and control securities.
In order to test if differences in the bid-ask spread skewness effected other
variables, the data was sorted and divided into quintiles by the change in spread
skewness pre/post SHO. These results are reported in Table 5. Panel A represents
the data for all securities broken into quintiles regardless of pilot or control stock
status. Panel B reports the first and fifth quintiles (top and bottom 20%) of pilot
securities. Panel C represents the same analysis for control securities. For pilot
securities, as reported in Panel B, there are statistically significant differences in
the highest and lowest quintiles for all variables with the exception of illiquidity.
Stocks which were in the top 20% of spread skewness changes showed an average
of 14.55% lower spreads compared to the bottom quintile. Similarly dollar spreads
for the top quintile were 18.63% lower than the bottom quintile. Price volatil-
ity is a small, but statistically significant 2.49% for the high quintile, and stock
turnover is 27% higher for the top 20% of securities. Similarly, spread volatility
8and spread kurtosis are lower by 20.38% and 29.27% respectively for the highest
quintile compared to the lowest quintile.
Panel C similarly contains the top and bottom quintiles of the change in
spread skewness for control securities. Similar to the pilot securities, stocks in the
highest quintile had 19.61% lower spreads, 8.87% lower dollar spreads, 3.96% lower
price volatility and 20.29% lower illiquidity (higher liquidity). This measure is very
large, and significant for the control securities, which is intriguing as illiquidity for
pilot securities stayed constant, indicating either an effect of the regulation on the
control securities, or changes in the sampling distribution as the control securities
contain many more small companies. Finally spread volatility and spread kurtosis
decreased by 13.26% and 8.56% respectively.
The final test in this analysis is a difference in difference regression. Using
data for all securities, a new variable was created capturing the change in bid-ask
spread skewness pre and post SHO. This new difference variable is then used as
the dependent variable in a regression, and the following equation:
SpreadSkewChange = β0 +β1Pilot+β2LogPrice+β3LogV ol+β4LogMktCap+
β5PV olt+ β6Illiq + β7Turn+ β8SpreadStDev + β9BetaChange+ β10Nasdaq
The independent variables in this regression include: a dummy variable signifying
if the security is a pilot or control stock, the natural logarithm of stock price (Log-
Price), volume (LogVol), and market capitalization (LogMktCap). Other variables
include price volatility (PVolt), illiquidity (Illiq), turnover (Turn), spread standard
deviation (SpreadStDev), CAPM beta change (BetaChange), and a dummy vari-
able if the security is listed on NASDAQ as opposed to the NYSE (Nasdaq).
This regression was run by adding variables individually, allowing the analy-
sis of the effects that subsequent independent additions have on existing variables.
When all variables are accounted for, every variable is statistically significant at
the less than 1% level. The results of the regression conclude that ceteris paribus,
a pilot security is associated with a decrease in the change of the spread skewness
by 0.097. The log of price is associated with an increase in the change of skewness
by 9.9%, the log of trade volume is associated with a positive change in spread
9skewness of 2.8%, and the log of market cap is associated with a decrease in the
change of spread skewness by 0.99%. Interestingly, the price of the security is
associated with a positive change, whereas the market cap is associated with a
negative change. The measures for price volatility, spread volatility, and change
in beta all are associated with negative changes in spread skewness, whereas illiq-
uidity, turnover, and the dummy variable for Nasdaq are associated with positive
spread skewness changes. Overall these results correspond to the univariate coun-
terparts in the direction of the movements. Holding other variables constant, the
results show that variables such as price, volume, illiquidity, and turnover increase
the change in skewness for securities.
These results show that the implementation of Reg SHO have vastly sim-
ilar effects on both pilot and non-pilot securities. We see that pilot securities
showed a statistically significant increase for spread and dollar spreads by 8.26%
and 5.75% respectively, and control securities showed a statistically significant in-
crease of 10.71% for bid-ask spreads (but not dollar spreads). These increases in
overall spreads may be associated with changes in the market during the post SHO
timeframe, however other explanations are possible. One explanation is market
makers, unsure how the regulations implementation would affect markets, tem-
porarily widened spreads for both pilot and control securities to lower their risks,
and evaluate how the marketplace reacts. Because the ability of informed short
sellers to act on pilot stocks without the uptick rule, the potential for market
makers to lose out during periods of high asymmetric information became more
likely.
From Table 3, we see that spread volatility decreased for pilot securities by
4.99%, and increased for control securities by 3.18%. The decrease in spread
volatility for pilot securities, while leading to a lower premium in expected stock
returns, as would be suggested by Blau and Whitby (2013), could also potentially
be explained by the role of short sellers and the flow of information into markets.
A decrease in the standard deviation of bid-ask spreads could signify that the
price discovery process is becoming more efficient, and therefore market makers
are able to, with more surety, set spreads. The inverse is true with the control
10
securities, with the uptick rule still in place, short sale information is not able to
be as efficiently passed into markets through the pricing mechanism, and therefore
the standard deviation of spreads increases to accommodate less surety by market
makers.
Throughout this analysis, the decreasing of spread skewness has been consis-
tent for both pilot and control securities. The original hypothesis that informed
short sellers would create higher asymmetric information in the markets, and
spreads would therefore become more right skewed, as would be suggested by
Roll and Subrahmanyam (2010) did not occur as originally hypothesized. The
best explanation for why spreads became less right skewed comes from the re-
search of Comerton-Forde, Jones, and Putni (2011) on the roles of short sellers in
the markets. Short sellers have the ability to provide liquidity to the market by
stepping in as unofficial market makers when spreads are abnormally wide, and
by stepping in to short securities after steep price increases. Because spreads are
becoming less skewed upon the implementation of Reg SHO, it appears that short
sellers are changing from liquidity demanders to liquidity suppliers. This change
overall is associated with higher market quality, with short sellers stepping in when
others are unwilling to do so.
0.4 Conclusion
The debate over short selling is not likely to diminish anytime soon, with polit-
ical views and regulatory actions implying that short selling manipulates markets,
and systematic sort selling, such as in bear raids, can force companies out of busi-
ness, the majority of academic research continues to find market-wide benefits to
short sellers. Short sellers, especially so called liquidity providing short sellers do
not generally pounce on ailing stocks undergoing a price decline, but rather act as
contrarian traders keeping prices more in line with fundamental values by shorting
stocks undergoing steep price increases, and jump in when spreads for a security
become abnormally wide (Diether, Lee Werner (2008), Blau and Brough (2011),
Comerton-Forde, Jones, and Putni (2011)). Short selling has also been shown to
increase market quality by acting as informal market makers, and improving the
11
price discovery process by changing trading activity around extreme events.
This research aims to examine how a relaxation of short sale constraints by
the removal of the uptick rule (Rule 10a-1), which has been in existence since 1938,
effects the skewness of bid ask spreads. Results in this study find that for both pilot
and control securities, the skewness of bid-ask spreads decreased, with most other
measures moving in the same direction. This research results in the conclusion
that with the lack of the price test rule for short selling, short sellers moved
from liquidity demanders, to liquidity providers. The shift to liquidity providing
short sellers stabilizes markets, and provides increases in market quality overall.
Research into the effects of short selling will need to continue being conducted
as the SEC has continued the use of short sale restrictions to try to stabilize
markets, such as the short selling ban during the 2008 financial crisis. Academic
literature has found that though short sellers have the potential to degrade market
quality and manipulate markets, the large majority of literature has found short
selling a benefit to markets. The information provided by short sellers is beneficial
to the price discovery process, contrarian trading keeps security prices closer to
fundamental values, and the ability of short sellers and high frequency traders
to act as informal market makers are all potential benefits of short sellers. The
relaxation of the short sale constraint of the uptick rule according to this research,
and prior research has found that important measures of market quality were either
improved, or unchanged after the implementation. The many positive benefits of
short selling in the markets therefore need to be considered by regulators when
deciding future regulation.
12
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table presents the summary statistics of the data used in this analysis. The data includes
the universe of stocks traded on Nasdaq or the NYSE which had an average price above $2.00
for the duration of the study. The time frame of the data includes the 60 days prior to, and
post the implementation of Regulation SHO on May 2nd 2005. The data included in this
table is broken into two panels, Panel A includes the statistics for the 60 days pre SHO, and
Panel B includes statistics for the 60 days post SHO. These panels include the variables of
Market Capitalization (Market Cap), Bid-Ask spreads (spread), Bid-Ask dollar spread (dollar
spreads), price volatility, illiquidity, daily share turnover (turnover) and three moments of the
spread distribution (spread skewness, kurtosis, and standard deviation). Price volatility is
calculated as the daily high price minus the daily low price, divided by the daily high price.
The measures of Mean, Median, Standard Deviation, Minimum, and Maximum are reported
for each of the aforementioned variables.
Panel A. Pre SHO
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Average Price 38.99 17.63 805.92 2.01 44,421.79
Market Cap 2,741,686.56 356,443.20 12,940,647.38 95.70 394,328,106
Spread 0.0056 0.0023 0.0100 -0.0645 0.2881
Dollar Spread 0.1149 0.0400 2.4847 -0.5700 300.0000
Price Volatility 0.0287 0.0219 0.0260 0.0000 0.7935
Illiquidity 0.2523 0.0092 1.7603 0.0000 155.6600
Turnover 8.3235 3.6027 33.7532 0.0008 2747.5500
Spread Skewness 1.4842 1.1589 1.9018 -7.0342 7.6561
Spread Kurtosis 7.0462 2.6511 10.5625 -5.9873 65.1196
Spread Std. Dev. 0.0043 0.0025 0.0051 -0.0006 0.0666
Panel B. Post SHO
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Average Price 38.57 17.57 798.12 2.01 44,421.79
Market Cap 2,705,168.83 356,443.20 12,969,305.98 350,017.15 408,108,985.00
Spread 0.0062 0.0024 0.0115 -0.0814 0.5000
Dollar Spread 0.1194 0.0400 2.4440 -1.1100 300.0000
Price Volatility 0.0271 0.0203 0.0254 0.0000 0.8229
Illiquidity 0.2893 0.0088 2.0267 0.0000 190.6975
Turnover 7.9483 3.3340 45.1124 0.0004 11030.7800
Spread Skewness 1.3889 1.0631 1.8542 7.0342 7.8792
Spread Kurtosis 6.6540 2.4776 9.9371 -5.6333 73.0179
Spread Std. Dev. 0.0044 0.0025 0.0056 0.0000 0.0990
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Table 2 Mean Changes Pre/Post SHO
This table reports the difference in means between the pre and post SHO implemen-
tation time periods for all stocks. Column 1 represents the mean before the SHO
implementation, Column 2 represents the mean in the post SHO implantation. Col-
umn 3 represents the change between the pre and post time periods as calculated by the
post minus the pre. Column 4 represents the percentage change between the two time
periods in order to give context to the amount of change. Finally Column 5 represents
the significance of these changes as measured by a T-test assuming equal variances with
reported P values.
*** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level
Table 2. Change Pre/Post SHO
Pre Mean Post Mean Change Percent Change Significance
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Spread 0.00559 0.00619 0.0006 10.73% *** (<.0001)
Dollar Spread 0.1149 0.1194 0.0045 3.92% (0.43)
Price Vol. 0.0287 0.0271 -0.0016 -5.57% *** (<.0001)
Illiquidity 0.2523 0.2893 0.037 14.67% *** (<.0001)
Turnover 8.3235 7.9483 -0.3752 -4.51% *** (<.0001)
Spread Skewness 1.4842 1.3889 -0.0953 -6.42% *** (<.0001)
Spread Kurtosis 7.0462 6.654 -0.3922 -5.57% *** (<.0001)
Spread Std. Dev. 0.00433 0.00445 0.00012 2.77% ***(<.0001)
Num. Observations 367,703 374,899
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Table 3 Comparison of Mean Changes Pre/Post SHO by Security Type
This table represents an analysis of the data by separating securities in the pilot group from
securities which did not undergo any changes (control group). The average values for Spreads,
Dollar Spreads, Price Volatility, Illiquidity, Spread Skewness, Spread Kurtosis, and Spread
Standard Deviation are reported. Column 1 (Column 5) represents variable averages for
securities in the pilot (control) program in the pre SHO time period, Column 2 (Column
6) reports the variables for pilot securities in the post SHO time frame. Column 3 (Column 7)
represents the percentage change between the pre and post SHO time period for each variable.
Finally Column 4 (Column 8) represent the significance of each change for both pilot and
non-pilot securities. P-values are reported in parentheses.
*** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level
Panel A: Pilot Securities
Pre Post Difference Significance
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Spread 0.0019 0.0021 8.25% *** (<.0001)
Dollar Spread 0.0545 0.0576 5.73% *** (0.0051)
Price Vol. 0.0285 0.0268 -6.13% *** (<.0001)
Illiquidity 0.0293 0.0349 19.15% * (0.0513)
Spread Skewness 1.5596 1.4413 -7.58% *** (<.0001)
Spread Kurtosis 9.1704 8.6768 -5.38% *** (<.0001)
Spread Std. Dev. 0.0023 0.0022 -4.99% *** (<.0001)
Num Observations 55,870 56,143
Panel B: Control Securities
Pre Post Difference Significance
[5] [6] [7] [8]
Spread 0.0062 0.0069 10.71% *** (<.0001)
Dollar Spread 0.1258 0.1303 3.58% (0.5035)
Price Vol. 0.0287 0.0271 -5.45% *** (<.0001)
Illiquidity 0.2922 0.3342 14.36% *** (<.0001)
Spread Skewness 1.4707 1.3796 -6.20% *** (<.0001)
Spread Kurtosis 6.6656 6.2977 -5.52% *** (<.0001)
Spread Std. Dev. 0.0047 0.0048 3.18% *** (<.0001)
Num Observations 311,833 318,756
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Table 4 Difference in Differences
Table 4 shows an analysis examining the difference in differences between pilot and control
securities. This is represented by the changes in pilot securities in the pre and post SHO
time periods for both pilot and control securities (Columns 1 and 2). Column 3 represents
the difference between the pilot and control securities, and Column 4 represents the statisti-
cal significance of these findings. This difference in differences allows us to examine if pilot
and control securities underwent significantly different changes under the implementation of
regulation SHO.
*** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level
Pilot Post - Pre Control Post - Pre Diff - Diff Significance
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Spread 0.000159 0.0006686 0.0005096 *** (<.0001)
Dollar Spread 0.003122 0.0045033 0.0013813 *** (<.0001)
Price Vol. -0.0017502 -0.0015631 0.0001871 (0.97)
Illiquidity 0.0056056 0.04196 0.0363544 *** (<.0001)
Spread Skewness -0.1182527 -0.0911337 0.027119 *** (<.0001)
Spread Kurtosis -0.4935973 -0.3678852 0.1257121 *** (<.0001)
Spread Std. Dev. -0.0001171 0.0001492 0.0002663 *** (<.0001)
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Table 5 Spread Skewness Quintiles
Table 5 represents an analysis of securities when broken into equal quintiles based on the overall change in spread skewness undergone during the SHO
implementation. The data is further broken into three panels, Panel A shows the overall changes for both pilot and control securities when broken into quintiles.
Panel B represents the top and bottom quintile (top and bottom 20%) for pilot securities, and Panel C represents the top and bottom quintiles for control
securities. The variables examined as they related to the change in spread skewness are Spreads, Dollar Spreads, Price Volatility, Illiquidity, Turnover, Spread
Standard Deviation, and Spread Kurtosis. P-values are reported in parentheses. *,**, *** denote statistical significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Panel A. Quintiles of Spread Skewness Change
Spread Dollar Spread Price Vol. Illiquidity Turnover Spread St.Dev Spread Skew Spread Kurt
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [7] [8] [9]
Q I (Low) 0.0051 0.0774 0.0279 0.2007 7.6555 0.0042 1.8872 11.3075
Q II 0.0071 0.0983 0.0983 0.3690 8.5949 0.0050 1.2852 4.7500
Q III 0.0069 0.2540 0.0281 0.3299 6.7815 0.0048 1.0765 3.8019
Q IV 0.0060 0.0867 0.0278 0.2874 7.9593 0.0043 1.2136 4.6662
Q V (High) 0.0041 0.0694 0.0268 0.1598 9.5560 0.0036 1.7221 9.8374
Q V - Q I -0.000996 *** -0.00797 *** -0.00104 *** -0.0409 *** 1.9005 *** -0.000674 *** -0.1652 *** -1.4701 ***
Significance (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
% Change -19.57% -10.34% -3.94% -20.38% 24.83% -16.08% -8.75% -13.00%
Panel B. Top and Bottom Quintiles of Spread Skewness Change for Pilot Securities
Spread Dollar Spread Price Vol. Illiquidity Turnover Spread St.Dev. Spread Skew Spread Kurt
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [7] [8] [9]
Pilot Q I (Low) 0.0022 0.0585 0.0281 0.0162 7.7783 0.00265 2.202 14.2922
Pilot Q V (High) 0.00188 0.0476 0.0274 0.0162 9.8788 0.00211 1.6143 10.1087
Pilot Q V - Q I -0.0003 *** -0.0109 *** -0.0006 *** 0.0000 2.1005 *** -0.0005 *** -0.5877 *** 4.1835 ***
Significance (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0002) (0.9393) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
% Change -14.55% -18.63% -2.49% 0.00% 27.00% -20.38% -26.69% -29.27%
Panel C. Top and Bottom Quintiles of Spread Skewness Change for Control Securities
Spread Dollar Spread Price Vol. Illiquidity Turnover Spread St.Dev. Spread Skew Spread Kurt
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [7] [8] [9]
Pilot Q I (Low) 0.00571 0.0812 0.0278 0.2385 7.6304 0.00445 1.8227 10.6958
Pilot Q V (High) 0.00459 0.074 0.0267 0.1901 9.4879 0.00386 1.7448 9.7802
Pilot Q V - Q I -0.0011 *** -0.0072 *** -0.0011 *** 0.0485 *** 1.8575 *** -0.0007 *** -0.0779 *** 0.9156 ***
Significance (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0002) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
% Change -19.61% -8.87% -3.96% -20.29% 24.34% -13.26% -4.27% -8.56%
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Table 6 Difference in Differences Regression
This table was created by running a difference in difference regression. This regression used the change in spread skewness pre and post SHO as the dependent
variable, with the variables including a dummy variable for pilot securities, normal logarithm of price, volume, and market cap. Other independent variables
include price volatility, illiquidity, turnover, spread standard deviation, change in CAPM Beta, and a dummy variable if the security was listed on the Nasdaq
exchange. The regression was run in a sequence, adding variables individually as to analyze how the addition of variables effects the given variables. Column 10
represents the regression with all variables included. Significances are shown including P-values in parenthesis. *, **, ***, denote significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
Intercept -0.0907 -0.3645 -0.5736 -0.5142 -0.4807 -0.4926 -0.4965 -0.4633 -0.4664 -0.5531 *** (<.0001)
Pilot -0.2766 -0.0666 -0.0967 -0.0948 -0.0943 -0.0947 -0.0935 0.0052 -0.0896 -0.0965 *** (<.0001)
logPrice 0.9970 0.0909 0.1031 0.1012 0.1022 0.0973 0.0030 0.0974 0.1000 *** (<.0001)
logVol 0.0008 0.0278 0.0315 0.0336 0.0304 0.0016 0.0282 0.0281 *** (<.0001)
logMktCap 0.0021 -0.0172 -0.0185 -0.0144 0.0023 -0.0143 -0.0099 *** (<.0001)
Price Volatility -0.5061 0.0821 -0.0593 0.0849 -0.5001 -0.8800 *** (<.0001)
Illiquidity 0.0010 0.0055 0.0010 0.0063 0.0050 *** (<.0001)
Turnover 0.0004 0.0000 0.0004 0.0004 *** (<.0001)
Spread Std. Dev 0.4512 -2.3024 -2.1906 *** (<.0001)
Beta Change -0.0354 -0.0359 *** (<.0001)
Nasdaq 0.0743 *** (<.0001)
R Squared 0.00 0.0035 0.0044 0.0045 0.0045 0.0046 0.0047 0.0047 0.005 0.0055
